The success of the Asian Tiger economies has always posed an interesting question for African economic policy: if these post-colonial countries could grow so rapidly, why haven’t most others? Strong authoritarian leadership and favorable geography are generally thought to explain some of the difference, but the rest is usually attributed to poor industrial policy on the part of African leaders.
Since the death of Lee Kuan Yew earlier this week, I’ve seen a number of articles questioning this narrative of Singapore’s exceptional growth. Kevin Lees notes that Lee’s own policy ideas weren’t always very good – the disasterous federation with Malaya being prime among them – and that he was supported by capable finance ministers who might have achieved good outcomes even under a different leader. More importantly, however, both Singapore and Hong Kong benefited greatly as destinations for overseas investment from China. As Lees writes, “The obvious inference is that, though British colonial rule of Hong Kong through 1997 may not have been democratic, liberal freedoms didn’t especially hinder the same kind of economic ‘miracle’ there.”
Tom Pepinsky points out that Singapore’s per capita GDP was already fairly high at independence. In his words,
Already by the 1970s, Singaporean GDP per capita actually exceeded that of the UK. But the main point to take away … is that Singapore entered the community of independent states as a prosperous country, at least by the standards of the time. That Singapore has progressed tremendously since independence is true, but not a story of turning the “Third World” into the first. If anything, it is a story of how to escape the middle income trap.
In another post, Tom shared a video that makes a similar point: the Singapore of 1957 looked more similar to the Singapore of today than one might have expected.
While not directly related to economic growth, I also found Emmanuel Yujuico’s post on the establishment of the Singaporean military fascinating. Lacking the domestic capability to build a strong army quickly, Lee solicited help from Israel, and the strong military relationship between the two countries persists to this day.
The World Bank’s People, Spaces, Deliberation blog recently ran a post that questioned pretty much all the conventional wisdom about making Northern-style good governance the centerpiece of development efforts. All five points are worth a read. Here are the first two:
1. Good governance is important for development. If this means that a large set of worthy ideals – including transparency in public affairs, accountability of power-holders to citizens, ability of citizens to make demands, absence of corruption, freedom of enterprise, secure property rights and rule of law – are necessary conditions for development success, the answer is clearly no.
The history of human progress, from 17th century England to 21st century China and Vietnam, is completely clear on this point: governance ideals are realised over time on the back of economic progress, not the other way round.
2. Governance-improvement is a good entry-point for developmental reform. This corollary might appear more defensible, but it isn’t. All experience tells us that institutions and social norms change slowly at best. Aid-supported institutional change has a well-documented tendency to produce either ‘capability traps’ or purely cosmetic improvements. History, especially the last half-century in Asia, shows that very significant gains in economic transformation and human well-being can be achieved within highly dysfunctional systems. Reform initiatives should surely aim to repeat those gains by whatever means are to hand.
As Matt Andrews and his colleagues have been arguing, reforms should be problem-driven and oriented to finding appropriate solutions. There is increasing evidence that problem-solving, adaptive methods can work, even when governments are largely unwilling partners in change. In contrast, donor ‘governance programmes’ contradict the idea of problem-driven reform almost by definition: even in the best of cases, their solutions are set out in advance.
The World Bank has announced an updated version of its global project map which includes its complete portfolio of projects for the first time. Of course I had to check out the Africa section. I definitely didn’t expect Nigeria to be the single biggest recipient of Bank aid, given that it’s currently the largest economy south of the Sahara. Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique round out the top five.
The AFDB also publishes geocoded data on its projects, along with an interactive map. It’s not quite as attractive as the Bank’s, but does give a more precise breakdown of project locations. With the exception of South Africa and Somalia, projects appear to basically be distributed in accordance with population density (only logical, of course).
Finally, AidData also publishes geocoded datasets and has a useful maps portal, with both interactive and static maps. The visualization is a bit less intuitive when the interactive map is zoomed out to cover the whole continent – note that the bubble for 1606 projects in Mozambique is the same size as that for 161 projects in South Africa – but ultimately this is the single best source of data on aid flows, as it incorporates the WB and AFDB data as well as data from other donors when available.
Kumasi in the late 19th century, from Encyclopaedia Britannica
For a long time, Northern scholars of Africa used to write about the continent as though the colonial period was the beginning of history. Jean-François Bayart famously argued against this, but even after his book appeared well-known authors like Mahmood Mamdani and Crawford Young made the case that colonization changed everything in Africa.
More recently, however, Northern researchers have started to take precolonial politics seriously again. I was thinking about this recently when Tanu Kumar sent me a link to this working paper by Mark Dincecco, James Fenske, and Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato. They argue that precolonial warfare in Africa led to greater levels of political centralization, but is also associated with higher rates of civil war today. Since civil war is generally bad for state capacity and development outcomes, this suggests that more centralized states in the precolonial era should be less developed today.
How does this argument hold up? Jacob Hariri suggests that stronger precolonial states outside Europe tended to resist the spread of European institutions which could promote democracy and economic growth, leading to lower income levels and higher rates of autocracy today. However, a number of other authors find that precolonial centralization in Africa is actually good for development. Nicola Gennaioli & Ilia Rainer and Stelios Michalopoulous & Elias Papaioannou all find higher rates of local public goods provision in places that had strong precolonial states. The mechanism here is presumably that strong states are able to solve coordination problems and engage in more economic activity. Philip Osafo-Kwaako & James Robinson also find that stronger precolonial states lead to better development outcomes today, although they argue that centralization wasn’t driven by warfare like Dincecco, Fenske and Onorato suggest.
It’s a really interesting literature, and I think it would be even stronger with more of a focus on mechanisms, and more explanatory case studies. If you look at subnational examples within Ghana and Uganda, you do tend to see stronger economic growth in the southern parts of those countries where precolonial polities were strongest (the Asante and Buganda kingdoms, respectively). But does this mean that the kingdoms were solving coordination problems somehow, or that centralized states simply arose where the economic prospects were better in the first place? Similarly, the link between precolonial centralization and contemporary civil war isn’t very intuitive to me. Civil war is badly overdetermined in Africa, in that most countries fit the criteria (poverty and weak institutions) that are thought to increase civil war risk. Academics still don’t seem to have a good model of why war happens when and where it does, rather than looking at aggregate risk factors, and I think until we understand more about the specificity of civil war it’s hard to know how to add precolonial centralization into the equation.
If you guessed war, you’d be wrong. Anke Hoeffler and James Fearon recently released a fascinating systematic review of the benefits of programs aimed at reducing different types of violence. There’s a brief summary at the CSAE blog, which was also the source of the graph below. To quote the introduction to the full report,
Our estimates suggest that the costs of violence are high; the welfare cost of collective, interpersonal violence, harsh child discipline, intimate partner violence and sexual abuse are equivalent to around 11 per cent of global GDP [annually]. The cost of homicides are much larger than the cost of civil conflict. However, violence perpetrated in the home appears to be the most prevalent form of violence. Domestic abuse of women and children should no longer be regarded as a private matter but a public health concern. … We argue for moving beyond a near-exclusive focus on civil war violence – concern with which has increased in the development community and is admirable and important – to recognizing that the costs of interpersonal violence are probably much larger but are almost wholly neglected in current development programming (pp. iii – iv).
The comparison between the estimated costs of civil war and “domestic” crimes like child abuse or intimate partner violence is staggering.
So why do academics, policymakers and development actors tend to focus on the form of violence that’s actually least costly? There’s the obvious point that conflict and terrorism are very public events, while child abuse and intimate partner violence tend to occur in private and often go unreported. War is also perceived as being more likely to be deadly, which might be true, but fails to account for the fact that domestic violence is much more prevalent. And I think there’s also a strong component of structural misogyny at play here. Civil wars and terrorism are seen as serious topics, often analyzed and carried out by men, while domestic violence is described as a women’s issue – something only of importance to a lesser constituency. (Consider the fact that no one’s asking if the Yazidis somehow deserved ISIS’ violence towards them, while many people claim that female victims of domestic violence must have done something to provoke their abusers. Now think about how notions of “deserving violence” correlate with the importance we put on crafting good policy responses to violence.) This report is a really important corrective to our tendency to write off domestic violence, and I’m quite interested to see how policymakers and development practitioners will respond.
I’ve written about Theodore Trefon’s article on public administration in the Congo before, but rereading it now, I’ve come across a striking sentence that I missed the first time around (p. 13):
The only certainty is that personal opportunism governs [the] actions [of state employees]. It is for this reason that administrative service providers in Congo are perceived as unmanageable, undisciplined, mercenary, corrupt and, quite simply, useless. A recent survey on how the Congolese perceive the state included the question: ‘if the state were a person, what would you do to him?’ ‘Kill him’ was the unequivocal reaction of most respondents (World Bank 2005, p. 22).
I kind of expect this to show up on a future UChicago undergraduate admissions essay. Perhaps respondents can choose between this one and “How do you feel about Wednesday?”.
Did you know that Japan was the second-biggest donor to the DRC (after the US) from 2011 – 2012? This and other interesting snapshots of recent ODA to the Congo are available at the OECD’s aid statistics portal.