Rather than revisiting the book’s conclusions directly, Straus used the conference to engage with the question of why the Western meta-narrative about Rwanda had shifted from a largely positive one in the early post-genocide period to the flurry of critiques that constitute it today.  In part, he felt that the shift was warranted.  Rwanda’s obvious intervention in the DRC contributed to an early change in public opinion, supported by the increasing number of defections from the RPF and the repressive manner in which the 2010 elections were handled.  The 2009 death of Alison des Forges, who was an early critic of the RPF’s slide towards authoritarianism, then spurred the generation of a number of commemorative conferences and works on Rwanda at a time when scholars were abandoning the self-censorship that had previously characterized much writing on the country.  Remaking Rwanda was one such work.

That said, Straus also acknowledged the complexity of Rwanda’s contemporary politics.  Whilst “it’s not a secret” that the RPF has installed an authoritarian regime, he also noted the challenges of governing a post-conflict country, and suggested that we are in need of better methods to evaluate the effects of authoritarianism in different contexts.  In part, he seemed to feel that this pointed to a need for more comparative work on Rwanda, and explicitly called for more comparisons with Burundi.  Of course, as another commentator pointed out, there’s an even larger set of potential comparative partners out there, since practically every leader in East Africa today came to power out of conflict.

Having had a few months to think this through, it does seem to me that much research on Rwanda is limited by a lack of comparison.  I do think there are good reasons to believe that genocide is a form of violence that’s analytically distinct from other types of civil conflict, but it also seems that some perspective is lost in treating Rwanda as completely unique.  Regression to authoritarianism (or illiberal democracy, or some other non-democratic form of rule) was common in the 1990s even among African states that hadn’t suffered conflict.  Straus’ more specific concern is that repression and “growing de facto ethnic inequality” will someday re-ignite all the familiar conflicts, which seems a likely outcome to me – one certainly sees the same pattern in both Rwanda and Burundi’s historical periods of ethnic conflict.  That said, one might gain a better understanding of the specific conditions that contribute to the re-ignition of conflict, or to its avoidance, in comparative perspective.  Uganda and Ethiopia might both be interesting places to start.

My current reading list is below; any additional suggestions or comments would be most welcome!  (I have more literature sitting unsorted on my hard drive, but this is what I successfully glanced through before my prospectus was due this week.)

Burundi

• Daley, “Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State,” 2006
• HRW, “Closing Doors?  The Narrowing of Democratic Space in Burundi,” 2010
• ICG, “Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk,” 2006
• Laely, “Peasants, Local Communities, and Central Power in Burundi,” 1997
• Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, 1996
  
• Levy, “The Road Ahead: Citizen Attitudes about Burundi in the Post-2010 Election Period,” 2011
• Peterson, “A Beacon for Central Africa,” 2006
• Reyntjens, “Burundi: A Peaceful Transition After a Decade of War?”, 2005
• Southall & Bentley, An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa, and Burundi, 2005
  
• Uvin, Life After Violence: A People’s History of Burundi, 2008
• Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: The Costs and Benefits of Burundi’s 2010 Elections,” 2011
• Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of Trial and Error,”  2009
• Watt, Burundi: Biography of a Small African Country, 2008
  

Rwanda

• Amnesty International, “Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect of Rwanda’s Laws on ‘Genocide Ideology’ and ‘Sectarianism,’” 2010
• Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 1999
• Hatzfeld, Machete Season (2005), Into the Quick of Life (2005), The Antelope’s Strategy (2009)
  
• Hintjens,  “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,” 2008
• HRW, “Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca Courts,” 2011.
• Ingelaere, “Living the Transition: A Bottom-Up Perspective on Rwanda’s Political Transition,” 2007
• Lemarchand, “Genocide, Memory, and Ethnic Reconciliation in Rwanda,” 2007
• Marysse & Reyntjens, The Political Economy of the Great Lakes Region, 2005
• Mgbako, “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” 2005
• Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 2002
• Morrill, “Reconciliation and the Gacaca: The Perceptions and Peace-Building Potential of Rwandan Youth Detainees,” 2004
• Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis (1997), Africa’s World War (2008)
  
• Purdekova, “Building a Nation in Rwanda?  De-Ethnicisation and its Discontents,” 2008
• Rettig, “Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda,” 2008
• Straus, The Order of Genocide (2007), Remaking Rwanda (2011)

Rwanda & Burundi

• Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 2006
• Lemarchand, Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 2008
  
• Schrami, “Ethnicised Politics: Patterns of Interpretation of Rwandans and Burundians,” 2010

Ethnicity

• Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict, 1999
  
• Saha, Ethnicity and Sociopolitical Change in Africa (2008), Perspectives on Contemporary Ethnic Conflict (2006)
• Wimmer et al., Facing Ethnic Conflicts, 2004

Burundi’s experience seems to contradict the classical criticism that consociational power-sharing “freezes” people’s identities and therefore deepens the segmental cleavages and divisions… Instead, the acknowledgement and institutionalisation of the segments’ political relevance may be seen as a first and necessary (though by no means final) step in the process of de-ethnicising political competition and of overcoming decades of politico-ethnic violence. (In which case neighbouring Rwanda still needs to embark on its own consociational journey, presumably after a next round of politico-ethnic violence). (p. 82, emphasis added)

Not that I don’t also think this is likely.  But it’s a bit chilling to hear the prospect of additional violence in Rwanda discussed so casually.

• Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, by Jan Vansina.  A must-read for understanding the political, economic, and social organization of pre-colonial Rwanda, and the deleterious way that colonialism interacted with the extant social identities of “Hutu” and “Tutsi.”  Alison Des Forges’ Defeat is the Only Bad News: Rwanda Under Musinga, 1986 – 1931 and Catherine Newbury’s The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1960 – 1960 cover the same period, although I haven’t read either yet.
• The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, by Gerard Prunier.  The most comprehensive history of the genocide that I’ve yet read.  Prunier is a formidable researcher, and he covers the period from independence up to the late 1990s in considerable detail and from a cogent analytical perspective.  His later research caused him to question this book’s favorable portrayals of Paul Kagame during several internal RPF struggles which took place during the 1990 – 1994 civil war, but I don’t think that detracts from the insight of the vast majority of analysis here.  Mahmood Mamdani’s When Victims Become Killers provides a similar look at the historical roots of the genocide.
• The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda, by Scott Straus.  Straus does incredible work investigating the microdynamics of the genocide, with specific attention to the way in which the national-level order to commit genocide was transmitted through various levels of political machinery, and actualized in slaughter at the local level.  This book should put to rest once and for all the misconception that the genocide was an unpremeditated outburst of “ancient tribal hatreds.”  Lee Ann Fuji’s Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda, which I haven’t read yet, looks like another excellent work on the genocide’s microdynamics.
• Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak, Life Laid Bare: The Survivors in Rwanda Speak, and The Antelope’s Strategy: Living in Rwanda After the Genocide, by Jean Hatzfeld.  Hatzfeld is a French journalist who conducted extensive interviews with genocide perpetrators and victims in the mid-1990s (for Machete and Life), and then again in the early 2000s (Antelope).  Machete and Life offer an incomparable into the human side of the local-level political violence that Straus documented in Order, whilst Antelope is a sobering reminder that the wounds of the genocide are still very much open for most Rwandans.  Essential reading.
• Remaking Rwanda: State-Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence, edited by Scott Straus & Lars Waldorf.  Published in 2011, this essay collection offers a fascinating look into social policy and domestic politics 15 years after the genocide.

What else would you recommend?  (Update: see the comments for some additional recommendations!)

Investment levels seem strongly correlated with natural resources (no surprise there), but don’t appear to have much relation to the ease of doing business in a country.  Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, and the Republic of Congo are all major oil exporters, even though of the 46 African countries the World Bank included in its 2011 Doing Business rankings*, they were respectively rated #17, 25, 31 and 40.  Chad, at #46, had more investment than Botswana at #3. And Somalia, a failed state that didn’t even make it into the Doing Business rankings, had only a touch less investment than vaunted reformer Rwanda.  Fascinating stuff.

*Only the current year’s data are up on the Doing Business site, and some countries have shifted rankings between 2009 (for which we have investment data) and 2011 (the business rankings).  For instance, I know that the DRC went from 183 of 183 in the world in Doing Business 2009 to a less whopping 175 of 183 in 2011.  That said, with the exception of unusually rapid reformers such as Rwanda, I doubt the investment climate has changed that significantly (with the exception of political unrest) in most countries over the last two years.

There is also, I think, the question of what right foreigners have to be blithely writing about politics and conflict in central Africa.  It’s a fair query; after all, I only lived in the region for a year, in capitals both times, and my Kinyarwanda and Lingala/Swahili skills are negligible.  (My Tshiluba and Kikongo skills are totally non-existent.)  I make no claim of privileged information on my own behalf.  But that said, the entanglements of our globalized world are here to stay.  I have to believe that, as a foreigner, working towards more proximately accurate understandings of such complicated regions – responsibly, honestly, and self-critically – is in the end more useful than withdrawing from conversation.

Update as of April 5:

• Via Tom of A View From the Cave, I’ve learned that Owen Barder has also written eloquently on the topic of privilege and African politics.  He reaches different conclusions, though.  Well-worth a read.
• James Wilson links to FSI language programs in Lingala and Swahili.
• Commentator zebrapad links to a useful Kinyarwanda vocab list.
• Another Kinyarwanda resource is Speak Rwanda.

Commentator Raha points out a more fundamental epistemological question, however: “Working in the region for about a decade does not make any difference to me.  That’s the problem of the so called ‘expert.’ …  I’m from the area and I know what I’m talking about.”  This is a very fair critique.  Whilst I do believe that it is possible to have a reasonably accurate understanding of a country or a culture that is not one’s own, there’s also an enormous amount of contextualized knowledge that comes with spending one’s life in a place.  Between the sensitivity of historical memory in Rwanda and the country’s noted lack of freedom of expression, getting an accurate read on such complicated questions from outside is very difficult.  And of course, the mere fact of having an internet connection and a grasp of English mean that one has entered into the power dynamics of our unevenly developed world.  Chris Blattman recently cautioned foreign bloggers against spreading unsubstantiated rumors of violence in Cote d’Ivoire, and I think that warning absolutely has to be borne in mind by anyone writing about politics and conflict in countries not their own.  If readers believe that I’m using this forum poorly or dangerously, then I absolutely encourage them to tell me so.

However, I did ultimately include that statement (which I still believe to be supportable on balance) for a reason.  One of my overriding interests in running this blog and my Twitter account has been the idea of publicizing information about Africa and development that seemed well-supported, yet sat outside mainstream narratives about these subjects.  Over the past several years, Rwanda has gotten a great deal of well-deserved attention for its economic and social reforms.  Informally, an acquaintance in Kigali once described the country’s strategy as “growing its way to stability,” so that the economic costs of returning to ethnic conflict would be untenable.  There is in any case a lot of good work happening in Rwanda, and the only reason I don’t write about it is because it seems so well-covered elsewhere.  (Perhaps I need to be more balanced in that regard.)

I remain concerned about the question of Rwanda’s long-term stability, though.  There’s a sunny Afro-optimism in much coverage of the country that seems to lack context, and I can’t help but question whether Rwanda’s current stability has truly been consolidated.  Rwanda under the RPF has absolutely done better in recovering from the genocide than I think anyone expected, and I don’t want to make light of the achievement of maintaining peace for the last decade, even through coercive means.  However,  I also find it hard to believe that the hurts of ethnic conflict have been durably laid to rest in less than a generation’s time, even with gacaca.  My concern is that some political shock (like the persistent but vague rumors about the FDLR’s plans to mount an invasion from E. Congo, or even a transition of power within the RPF) might lay bare these ethnic fault lines and tumble the country back into conflict.  I don’t intend to dismiss or belittle Rwanda’s achievements, but nor do I think that it’s ultimately useful to ignore the real social tensions that still lie beneath the surface.

(Please comment away; whilst I know all the commentators on the last post didn’t agree with each other, I’m at the least glad that everyone had an equal platform to share their views and respond to each other.)

One commentator took on the political economy of the report’s publication, noting that many Congolese found psychological and emotional value in seeing the UN provide proof of crimes they had long known to have occurred.  However, the report’s existence also complicates peacebuilding efforts in the region.  “There’s blood on almost everyone’s hands,” as almost every government in the region has some members who’ve been guilty of massive human rights abuses at some point.  This is clearly visible in Rwanda’s treatment of Laurent Nkunda, who will “probably never go on trial” because he knows too much about the crimes committed by all sides during the wars.  In the end, she believes that transitional justice is unlikely to happen unless outside donors put strong pressure on regional governments.

Another commentator provided a bit of historical perspective on both violence and justice in eastern Congo, pointing out that political and social coalitions around justice in the DRC are very weak and fragmented now compared to 5 or 6 years ago.  There has been a simultaneous growth in the entrenchment of violence with economic interests, especially trade and mining.  Part of this entanglement was due to the desire of foreign armies to “do war on the cheap” by getting locals to do their killing for them, which provided space for “sophisticated entrepreneurs of violence” to use access to weapons to their own commercial ends.

Whilst the report itself only covered the period 1993 – 2003, the ensuing discussion also touched upon more recent developments in both Congo and Rwanda.  As one speaker pointed out, there’s been a welcome increase in Western attention to gender-based violence in the eastern DRC of late – but it’s important to avoid reducing issues of justice to the prosecution of rape and war crimes.  What the Congo ultimately needs is a “massive institution-building project” on the scale of decades, in order to rebuilt judicial systems that might handle everything from property rights and contracts to war crimes.  The international community has also largely elided the issues of land rights and citizenship for Rwandaphone Congolese in the Kivus, which remain at the heart of the ongoing conflict in the region.

That said, the “idea that the Congolese are doomed to fight each other is ridiculous.”  There are spaces in the DRC that are relatively well-governed, such as Butembo and Katanga.  More attention is needed to the factors that enable better governance in the Congolese context.

Finally, a number of interesting points that didn’t quite fit in elsewhere in the above narrative also came up:

• Rwanda was described as “a boiling cauldron under a surface that looks calm,” with Hutu resentment running high, and ethnic identities remaining highly salient despite official attempts to ban their use.
• The US values stability over all else in the region.  Kagame and Mobutu both contributed to stability, as did Museveni, and the US is willing to turn a blind eye to many other abuses because of this.
• Africa more generally is “kind of the neglected stepchild of diplomacy,” with some dedicated diplomats, but others who got dumped there with little previous knowledge of the region.

Did anyone else attend this meeting of the GLPF, or the one that took place on March 24 on human security in the DRC?  Would love to hear thoughts if so!

Congo

• Economically, the DRC is doing much better than it did after the immediate end of the war.  However, it’s barely integrated into the world or even regional economies, and very few industries have national reach (except for banking and transport).  Funds mostly flow from regional governments to Kinshasa, not the other way.  China is now its biggest aid donor.
• The DRC’s interactions with the rest of the world are conducted by the “thin sliver” of government that presents the integrated Congo.  “From an economic and administrative point of view, the country doesn’t exist.”  However, it’s still very much in existence as a political entity.
• Despite the ongoing war in the east, most of the country is at peace.  Only ~20% of Congolese live in the east.  That said, the Kabila regime has proven better at diplomacy than at either economic management or state-building & conflict resolution.
• The Kivus are really more connected to Uganda/Rwanda/Burundi than to western Congo.  It would have been appropriate to have two settlements to the ’98-’02 war: one for the Kivus, and one for the rest of Congo.
• When this speech occurred, Prunier felt that the government was behaving in an increasingly brutal and arbitrary manner towards its opponents, whilst there was no direct threat to its security to warrant this.  (The recent assassination attempt might have changed that calculus.)  At the time, however, he pointed out that the CNDP and its offshoot militias in the Kivus were in no position to overthrow the government.
• The increase in state brutality might reflect Kabila’s concerns for his political survival – or it might mean that he’s losing control of his security apparatus.  Angola is well-positioned to put pressure on Kabila about this and other issues, but they don’t want to destabilize the DRC.

Rwanda

• Rwanda is among the most opaque countries on the continent, comparable to Ethiopia and Eritrea.  One can reproach the Congolese for many things, but at least politically “nothing is hidden, they let it all hang out.”
• There does appear to be fighting in the RPF’s inner circle.  There’s been a recent wave of assassination attempts and arrests of regime figures, including a former army chief of staff and the deputy commander of the Rwandese UNAMID force in Darfur.
• Putting Laurent Nkunda on trial is undesirable for Kagame, because Nkunda knows too much about abuses committed by the RPF.  Prunier estimates that Kagame has killed 13 people who used to work with Nkunda, and is aiming to kill as many as he can.
• There are rumors that the (Tutsi-affiliated) CNDP is talking to the (Hutu-affiliated) FDLR in eastern Congo, and considering using it as a base to overthrow Kagame, just as the RPF used western Uganda as a base for their attacks on the MRND.  Internal ethnic politics are also unsettled, as Tutsis who returned from Congo/Burundi/Tanzania are being marginalized in comparison to Ugandan Tutsis.
• The UN mapping report, with its revelations that the RPF had massacred Hutu refugees in the Congo from ’96-’97, has diminished Rwanda’s moral authority in the eyes of the West.  Kagame had benefited tremendously from the developed world’s willingness to turn a blind eye to his authoritarianism out of guilt.  Prunier believes that a number of photogenic development initiatives, like the banning of plastic bags and the installation of wifi in public buses in Kigali, are “completely designed for the wazungu.”

I’d welcome thoughts from readers who know the region better than I do.

NB: To address the points raised by several commentators, I don’t think Prunier intended to imply that Rwanda has had no policy achievements of value under Kagame.  In many ways (especially health and economic policy), Rwanda is a good example of the benefits that can come of a strong, development-oriented African government.  This should be acknowledged along with the continued political repression and lingering grievances of the genocide if one hopes to take a more balanced view of the country.

That time I was standing on a table in the middle of a tshirt factory when the owner walked in, I didn’t think, how did I get here? Or stranded on the side of the road somewhere between Sierra Leone and Liberia when the bush taxi broke down and we all sat on logs waiting for another car to come by and shepherd us to the next town, I didn’t think, how did I get here? …  I know how I got to those places. The question is just how I got back.

Waking up in my own apartment, with running water and central air and electricity to keep the fridge going, still feels stranger to me than piling into a matatu in Kigali with twenty other people and a few chickens.  Stranger than walking back to Walewale after a day surveying in rural villages, using the Tigo cell tower next to my office to navigate my way through dusty fields.  Not quite as strange as the double economy in Kinshasa, where one could pay US$8 for mangoes imported from Belgium at City Market or 20 cents for local mangoes at the bus stop – but still.  The thought of six months passing since last I stood in Ghana is unreal.

It is in memory of this that I’ve been flipping through all of my Africa photos again, and thought I’d post a few favorites from countries beyond the usual suspects:

A tree grows in Kampala

Mosaic from a monument at Place de la Revolution, Bujumbura

Drinking local in Addis