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Successfully scaling up cash transfer programs in Burkina Faso

A hand holding about 15 fanned out CFA notes, each worth 10,000 francs

CFA notes, via Young Diplomats

Apolitical recently published a profile of Burkina Faso’s national cash transfer program, which grew out of a pilot funded by the World Bank.  It’s an interesting contribution to the recent discussion about scaling up successful interventions which has been going on at places like Vox and Evidence Action.

One of the main points is that expanding a pilot already run by the government may be more feasible than having the government adopt a program previously run by NGOs.

But the World Bank evaluation did make an important difference to the design of the national policy. One valuable factor was the way the trial involved the government from the beginning, creating expertise among local officials before the national program was launched.

That’s quite unusual, de Walque said. “What you find often is it’s done by some local or international NGO,” he explained, which means the government is less familiar with the program it’s trying to implement.

In Burkina Faso, the cash transfer trial was organised by a senior government official. “The scaling up is more likely to be successful if people from the government use the pilot as a training ground,” de Walque suggested.

As well as involving senior figures from an early stage, the trial created a pool of qualified employees for the early stages of the national program. Local workers who were hired and trained to implement the pilot were top candidates to help launch the policy at scale.

Another takeaway is that it’s likely a pilot program will need to be simplified to be implemented at scale — but understanding how to simplify it is crucial.

Creating this kind of [government] ownership and involvement is valuable because of the way governments inevitably leave out some details from a pilot. “Obviously when you go to a larger scale governments, and probably rightly so, at least in the first attempt, choose more simple programs,” de Walque said.

If the officials in charge have direct experience from the trial stage, they’re more likely to know which simplifications are feasible and which could seriously undermine the program.

Africa Update for January 2019

Here’s my latest link round-up from Africa Update.  We’ve got Angolan goat delivery apps, contraception compromises in Rwanda, a deep dive on the Congolese election, postdocs for African physicists, and more.

A skyscraper with fireworks exploding behind itHappy New Year from Nairobi!  (Photo by Sarah Kimani)

West Africa: Meet the only bookseller of Guinea-Bissau.  Read about one Nigerian man’s horrifying experience in captivity in Libya as he tried to emigrate to Europe.  This all-female biker gang in Nigeria drives around the country doing health education for other women.  Here’s some useful background on the current protests in Togo.  Listen to this podcast on statelessness in West Africa from the Center for Democratic Development in Ghana. Across West Africa, women are increasingly likely to ask for divorces if their marriages aren’t going well.

Central Africa: In Rwanda, where the Catholic Church runs many hospitals, the government has come to a compromise with them about birth control by providing access to contraception in tiny clinics right outside the hospitals.  Tim Longman recommends this profile of Rwanda’s Kagame (in French) as balanced and insightful.  Burundi has officially moved its capital from Bujumbura to the small city of Gitega.  North Korean soldiers are training elite army forces in Uganda.  Secondary schools in Uganda are also piloting new Mandarin language classes before rolling them out nationwide.  In the Central African Republic, carrying out surveys is a dangerous pasttime.  Check out these data visualizations of Kinshasa’s population and flight patterns.

Congolese elections:  Here’s a detailed overview of the political landscape in the DRC in the runup to the Dec. 30 election.  Human Rights Watch and Christoph Vogel have written about widespread human rights abuses during polling. Election monitors organized by the Catholic Church have announced that opposition candidate Martin Fayulu gained a majority of votes.  The government complained that the Church shouldn’t have announced their results before the official results, widely expected to favor the president’s preferred candidate Emmanuel Shadary, were in.  Laura Seay and Jason Stearns have both shared informed speculation about how the situation will evolve on Twitter.

Map listing uprisings against colonization across AfricaMap interlude: this is a remarkable map of selected anti-colonial uprisings from Paperless History

East Africa:  Kenyans are speaking up about extrajudicial killings by the police.  In your unusual political dispute for the day, Kenyan salt companies are complaining after the water regulator said they should have paid for the use of sea water in their factories.   Here are some good overviews of the last year in politics in Kenya and Tanzania.  Ethiopian refugees in Sudan have accused UNHCR of demanding bribes before they can be listed for resettlement elsewhere.  What can the popular uprisings of 1964 and 1985 tell us about Sudan’s current protests?  The Saudi-backed coalition in Yemen is hiring teenage soldiers from Darfur to fight on the front lines.  Eritrea’s secretive president rarely tells his ministers anything about policy before it’s implemented.  This is why cycling is so surprisingly popular in Eritrea.

Southern Africa:  This was an insightful post about the politics of cholera control in Zambia.  In Mozambique, pregnant students at secondary schools can now attend classes during the day instead of being forced to attend night classes “where they cannot be seen.”  Madagascar’s prisons sound really horrifying.  As the tobacco market shrinks, farmers in Malawi are considering switching to marijuana instead.  Angola now has an app for delivering live goats to your door.

Politics + economics: Apolitical is curating stories of young people’s experiences in the civil service across Africa.  Don’t miss this new book about the rich histories of medieval trade in Africa.  African activists are taking on climate change.  Here’s why medium-scale farms have quietly been on the rise across Africa.

Research + conferences: The National Academic Digital Repository of Ethiopia is a making all research from Ethiopian universities available online.  African physicists should apply to this Fields Institute postdoc by January 31.  Apply to the East Africa Social Science Translation Collaborative at Berkeley by March 1.  Read about why conferences on Africa should be held in Africa.  Nigerian magazine The Republic is soliciting essays about the experience of conducting research in Africa.

The Kan festival requests artwork related to Pan Africanism. No fee required. Submit to kanfestival dot com by Jan 15Calling all African artists!  (Via KAN Festival)

Art + innovation: The Nigerian publisher Kachifo has a call for manuscripts open till March 31.  Check out five inspired inventions from African engineers.  Africa Science Week Kenya produced a lot of fascinating material, including the Faces of Kenyan Science and this book of interesting facts about Kenyan science.  African edutainment programs for kids are on the rise.  Here are the must-read books of 2018 by African authors.

The carbon benefits of living in Nairobi

A graph labeled "your carbon dashboard," comparing the US average carbon consumption to a personalized estimate

I recently bought my TerraPass carbon offsets for the year.  As I completed my individual carbon footprint estimate, I was struck at both how much lower my total footprint was compared to the US average, and how differently it was distributed.  I’ve been flying to the US and Europe quite often since moving to Kenya to keep up with my personal and professional obligations there, so I assumed that my total footprint would be higher than average.  Here’s what I’m noticing about each category of emissions.

  • Because the commercial districts of Nairobi are very compact, I rarely take trips more than 4 or 5 miles from my house.  I drive a relatively fuel-efficient motorcycle if I’m on my own, or take a taxi if I’m with someone else.  My neighborhood is also unusually walkable, so lots of activities like trips to the grocery store or the dentist can be done on foot or by bike.
  • Taxi travel accounts for most of the “public transit” category, since Nairobi hasn’t got a public bus system or commuter rail.  However, I suspect emissions for this category are underestimated, since taxi travel here does frequently entail long periods idling in traffic.
  • My air travel emissions are still far too high in both relative and absolute terms.  This is a tough one, since I’m flying a lot for academic conferences, Mawazo fundraising, and visits to my family and my partner’s.  Video calls can partially but not completely substitute for these in-person connections.  Not quite sure what to do about this.
  • Because of Nairobi’s beautiful climate, I don’t have any costs to heat or cool my apartment.  The emissions in the “home energy” category come from my fairly low spending on electricity and cooking gas.  However, I also think that these are overstated, because the electricity estimate was done with US power generation in mind, and the Kenyan power sector uses 70% renewable resources, compared to only 18% in the US.

Legal aid for prisoners in Kenya and Uganda

A Kenyan man hugs a woman, with several other smiling people standing around behind him

Morris Kaberia celebrates after being released from prison (via Face2Face Africa)

Face2Face Africa recently published an interesting profile of the African Prisons Project, which provides legal aid to prisoners in Kenya and Uganda.  Many imprisoned people can’t afford a lawyer or effectively defend themselves without assistance.  APP runs legal advice clinics in prisons, and also offers a bachelor of law (LLB) degree through the University of London’s remote study program.

The state of legal aid in Kenya is patchy.  The Department of Justice formed a pilot legal aid program in 2007, and it also proposed legislation to expand the program around 2015.  However, the state of implementation is unclear, with many articles mentioning an action plan for activities, but few actual activities.  Private organizations like Kituo Cha Sheria and Namati also provide some legal aid.  I haven’t been able to find statistics on the proportion of Kenyan court cases where defendants have legal representation, but anecdotally the percentage still seems low, so there do appear to be gaps left to fill.

Interesting academic articles for January 2019

Here are some recent papers which I’m looking forward to reading.  They include updates on the DRC, the political economy of social protection programs in Kenya, taxation in Zambia, and bureaucracy in Peru.

Christoph Vogel and Jason Stearns. 2018.  “Kivu’s intractable security conundrum, revisited.African Affairs 117 (469): 695 – 707.

During this past decade, four developments have altered the contours of the [Congolese] conflict, contributing to a perpetuation of violence and insecurity. First, Congolese political and military elites have become increasingly invested in conflict, rendering it an end in itself. Instead of promoting cohesion and discipline, the government has perceived its security apparatus primarily as a means for distributing patronage, only occasionally prioritizing stability. Second, with the end of the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) rebellion in 2009, and more dramatically since the defeat of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) in 2013, regional involvement has decreased and the Kivus have seen few foreign-backed rebellions. This, combined with the national political crisis, has led armed groups to switch the focus of their bellicose rhetoric away from Rwanda towards Kinshasa. Third, there has been a dramatic proliferation of belligerents from a few dozens to over a hundred, while at the same time armed groups have coalesced into often unstable coalitions. Fourth, and most recently, insecurity is becoming increasingly politicized as political turmoil reverberates in the Kivus, prompting elites to bolster their influence through armed mobilization.

Alexander de Juan and Carlo Koos. 2018.  “The historical roots of cooperative behavior — evidence from eastern Congo.”  World Development 116: 100 – 112.

Cooperative norms and behavior are considered to be essential requirements for sustainable stabilization and development in conflict-affected states. It is therefore particularly important to understand what factors explain their salience in contexts of war, violence and displacement. In this paper, we assess the role of historical political legacies. We argue that precolonial processes of nation-building have strengthened people’s communal bonds to an imagined community, and that these bonds continue to positively impact present-day cooperative norms and behavior. We investigate this argument using the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as an empirical case. We combine historical information on the location and the main features of the precolonial Bushi Kingdom with original georeferenced survey data to investigate variation in cooperative norms within and outside of the boundaries of the precolonial “nation.” We exploit information on people’s awareness of proverbs associated with the original foundation myths of the kingdom to assess the role of long-term norm persistence. We find evidence in line with our argument on the historical roots of cooperative behavior.

Marion Ouma and Jimi Adésìna.  2018. “Solutions, exclusion and influence: Exploring power relations in the adoption of social protection policies in Kenya.”  Critical Social Policy.

Power, and how it is exercised within social relations is pivotal in explaining policy change. However, its analysis as an explanatory variable in understanding social protection policy uptake processes in developing countries remains unexplored. Using two cases of cash transfer programmes in Kenya, we examine the dynamics of power relations in the uptake of social protection policies. This article contributes to recent scholarship examining the adoption process in African countries but in departure demonstrates that asymmetrical power relations between actors are/have been central to the uptake of the programmes. The study found that within social relations in the policy space, agents exercised power in three ways. First, by controlling the policy agenda by insertion of experts; second, by excluding other actors through a process of depoliticisation; and third, by influencing the preference of domestic actors through social learning.

David Evans, Brian Holtemeyer, and Katrina Kosec.  2018.  “Cash transfers increase trust in local government.”  World Development 119: 138 – 155.

How does a locally-managed conditional cash transfer program impact trust in government? On the one hand, delivering monetary benefits and increasing interactions with government officials (elected and appointed) may increase trust. On the other hand, it can be difficult for citizens to know to whom to attribute a program and reward with greater trust. Further, imposing paternalistic conditions and possibly prompting citizens to experience feelings of social stigma or guilt, could reduce trust. We answer this question by exploiting the randomized introduction of a locally-managed transfer program in Tanzania in 2010. Our analysis reveals that cash transfers can significantly increase trust in leaders. This effect is driven by large increases in trust in elected leaders as opposed to appointed bureaucrats. Perceptions of government responsiveness to citizens’ concerns and honesty of leaders also rise, and these improvements are largest where there are more village meetings at baseline. One of the central roles of village meetings is to receive and share information with village residents, providing some evidence on the value of a high-information environment for generating trust in government. We also find that records from school and health committees are more readily available in treatment villages. Notably, while stated willingness of citizens to participate in community development projects rises, actual participation in projects and the likelihood of voting do not. Overall, the results suggest little reason to worry that local management of a conditional cash transfer program reduces trust in government or the quality of governance—especially in high-information settings.

Moizza Binat Sarwar.  2018.  “The political economy of cash transfer programmes in Brazil, Pakistan and the Philippines.”  ODI working paper.

Pro-poor policies, such as cash transfers, hold wide appeal for politicians in times of economic crises because of the visibility and high level of international support available for such measures. The political returns to politicians from a widespread pro-poor policy are significant: they potentially expand their voter base. The highly visible link between the politician and cash transfers has mobilised politicians to invest in state capacity and reach eligible citizens. Methods of selecting eligible participants and delivering cash has allowed local politicians to gain electoral mileage from central government actions. In the longer term, it can be very difficult for subsequent regimes to dismantle far-reaching propoor programmes without risking high levels of unpopularity. Consequently, future governments try to establish ownership over the programmes by improving and/or expanding them.

Danielle Resnick.  2018.  “Tax compliance and representation in Zambia’s informal economy.”  IGC working paper.

What drives tax compliance among informal workers and does it affect demands for political representation? While these questions have been posed previously in political economy scholarship, there are few studies that examine these dynamics among informal workers, who constitute the majority of the population in developing countries. Contrary to assumptions that informal workers fall outside the tax net, they often encounter a variety of taxes collected by national and local authorities. Based on an original survey with over 800 informal workers across 11 markets in Zambia’s capital, Lusaka, and interviews with relevant policymakers, this paper finds that compliance tends to be higher among those workers operating in markets with better services, providing support for the fiscal exchange hypothesis. Moreover, using a vote choice experiment, I find that those who pay taxes, regardless of how much they pay, are more likely than those who do not to vote for a hypothetical mayoral candidate interested in improving market services and stall fees rather than one interested in broader social goods, such as improving education and schools in Lusaka. The results suggest that even among a relatively poor segment of the population, tax revenue can be mobilized if the benefits of those taxes are directly experienced and that just the process of paying taxes can affect an individual’s demand for representation by policymakers.

Andrew Dustan, Stanislao Maldonado, and Juan Manuel Hernandez-Agramonte. 2018. “Motivating bureaucrats with non-monetary incentives when state capacity is weak: Evidence from large-scale field experiments in Peru.”  Working paper.

We study how non-monetary incentives, motivated by recent advances in behavioral economics, affect civil servant performance in a context where state capacity is weak. We collaborated with a government agency in Peru to experimentally vary the content of text messages targeted to civil servants in charge of a school maintenance program. These messages incorporate behavioral insights in dimensions related to information provision, social norms, and weak forms of monitoring and auditing. We find that these messages are a very cost-effective strategy to enforce compliance with national policies among civil servants. We further study the role of social norms and the salience of social benefits in a follow-up experiment and explore the external validity of our original results by implementing a related experiment with civil servants from a different national program. The findings of these new experiments support our original results and provide additional insights regarding the context in which these incentives may work. Our results highlight the importance of carefully designed non-monetary incentives as a tool to improve civil servant performance when the state lacks institutional mechanisms to enforce compliance.

 

An unexpected transfer of power in the DRC

Several young Congolese men hold up a poster of Felix Tshisekedi

Supporters of Félix Tshisekedi at a rally outside his party headquarters. (Photo via The Star)

I’ve written an analysis of the recent Congolese elections for Democracy in Africa.  Beyond recounting the events of the election, I’ve tried to draw two broader lessons from it as well.  The first has to do with the changing nature of presidential authority in the DRC.

[The transfer of power] demonstrates that even a strong president can’t hold on to power indefinitely in the fact of increasing diplomatic and societal opposition.  Kabila has major advantages in the political game, including great personal wealth and command of the armed forces, who are regularly deployed domestically to harass protestors.  Yet he only managed to delay his departure from office by two years, and couldn’t compel a sufficient number of voters to accept his chosen replacement. He also agreed to a peaceful transfer of power to his successor.

This is quite different to the days of the dictator Mobutu, who held on to power in the DRC for more than thirty years in the face of continual protests and diplomatic isolation, and only left when he was overthrown by Laurent Kabila’s rebel group in 1997.

The second has to do with the fact that unusual alliances are actually not that unusual in Congolese politics.

The fractious and personalized nature of Congolese electoral politics opens the door to unusual coalitions, such as that between Kabila and Tshisekedi.  The electoral system is structurally designed to produce weak parties oriented around a single politician. It’s easy to register political parties in the DRC, and the country’s virtually non-existent private sector makes the perks of elected office look unusually appealing.  The result is a proliferation of dozens of tiny parties contesting every election.

Once elected, politicians form an ever-shifting constellation of alliances as they seek to maximize their access to state resources.  Seeing candidates come to an agreement across the aisle is not nearly as unusual in the DRC as it is in parts of Europe or North America.