Africa Update for January 2019

Here’s my latest link round-up from Africa Update.  We’ve got Angolan goat delivery apps, contraception compromises in Rwanda, a deep dive on the Congolese election, postdocs for African physicists, and more.

A skyscraper with fireworks exploding behind itHappy New Year from Nairobi!  (Photo by Sarah Kimani)

West Africa: Meet the only bookseller of Guinea-Bissau.  Read about one Nigerian man’s horrifying experience in captivity in Libya as he tried to emigrate to Europe.  This all-female biker gang in Nigeria drives around the country doing health education for other women.  Here’s some useful background on the current protests in Togo.  Listen to this podcast on statelessness in West Africa from the Center for Democratic Development in Ghana. Across West Africa, women are increasingly likely to ask for divorces if their marriages aren’t going well.

Central Africa: In Rwanda, where the Catholic Church runs many hospitals, the government has come to a compromise with them about birth control by providing access to contraception in tiny clinics right outside the hospitals.  Tim Longman recommends this profile of Rwanda’s Kagame (in French) as balanced and insightful.  Burundi has officially moved its capital from Bujumbura to the small city of Gitega.  North Korean soldiers are training elite army forces in Uganda.  Secondary schools in Uganda are also piloting new Mandarin language classes before rolling them out nationwide.  In the Central African Republic, carrying out surveys is a dangerous pasttime.  Check out these data visualizations of Kinshasa’s population and flight patterns.

Congolese elections:  Here’s a detailed overview of the political landscape in the DRC in the runup to the Dec. 30 election.  Human Rights Watch and Christoph Vogel have written about widespread human rights abuses during polling. Election monitors organized by the Catholic Church have announced that opposition candidate Martin Fayulu gained a majority of votes.  The government complained that the Church shouldn’t have announced their results before the official results, widely expected to favor the president’s preferred candidate Emmanuel Shadary, were in.  Laura Seay and Jason Stearns have both shared informed speculation about how the situation will evolve on Twitter.

Map listing uprisings against colonization across AfricaMap interlude: this is a remarkable map of selected anti-colonial uprisings from Paperless History

East Africa:  Kenyans are speaking up about extrajudicial killings by the police.  In your unusual political dispute for the day, Kenyan salt companies are complaining after the water regulator said they should have paid for the use of sea water in their factories.   Here are some good overviews of the last year in politics in Kenya and Tanzania.  Ethiopian refugees in Sudan have accused UNHCR of demanding bribes before they can be listed for resettlement elsewhere.  What can the popular uprisings of 1964 and 1985 tell us about Sudan’s current protests?  The Saudi-backed coalition in Yemen is hiring teenage soldiers from Darfur to fight on the front lines.  Eritrea’s secretive president rarely tells his ministers anything about policy before it’s implemented.  This is why cycling is so surprisingly popular in Eritrea.

Southern Africa:  This was an insightful post about the politics of cholera control in Zambia.  In Mozambique, pregnant students at secondary schools can now attend classes during the day instead of being forced to attend night classes “where they cannot be seen.”  Madagascar’s prisons sound really horrifying.  As the tobacco market shrinks, farmers in Malawi are considering switching to marijuana instead.  Angola now has an app for delivering live goats to your door.

Politics + economics: Apolitical is curating stories of young people’s experiences in the civil service across Africa.  Don’t miss this new book about the rich histories of medieval trade in Africa.  African activists are taking on climate change.  Here’s why medium-scale farms have quietly been on the rise across Africa.

Research + conferences: The National Academic Digital Repository of Ethiopia is a making all research from Ethiopian universities available online.  African physicists should apply to this Fields Institute postdoc by January 31.  Apply to the East Africa Social Science Translation Collaborative at Berkeley by March 1.  Read about why conferences on Africa should be held in Africa.  Nigerian magazine The Republic is soliciting essays about the experience of conducting research in Africa.

The Kan festival requests artwork related to Pan Africanism. No fee required. Submit to kanfestival dot com by Jan 15Calling all African artists!  (Via KAN Festival)

Art + innovation: The Nigerian publisher Kachifo has a call for manuscripts open till March 31.  Check out five inspired inventions from African engineers.  Africa Science Week Kenya produced a lot of fascinating material, including the Faces of Kenyan Science and this book of interesting facts about Kenyan science.  African edutainment programs for kids are on the rise.  Here are the must-read books of 2018 by African authors.

Against support for rebellions

Edward Carpenter had a hard-hitting post at the Duck of Minerva recently about when it makes sense for the international community to intervene on behalf of rebel groups, and it hasn’t generated nearly the discussion it deserved.  He comes to several conclusions that run strongly against prevailing liberal norms of human rights protection and democratization:

The existing government may not be very good – but the alternative will probably be worse. Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi – neither were model leaders by according to the liberal democratic ideal, but life for the majority of Iraqis and Libyans was better under their rule. The same can be said for Bashar al Assad and Nouri al Maliki, although in the latter case especially, “better” is a relative statement, since an average of over 1000 Iraqi civilians have died or been wounded every month as a result of internal violence (bombings, shootings, etc) during his tenure as Prime Minister.

No population has benefited from the long-running civil wars or instability that has resulted from an existing state government being overthrown by networked opposition elements; and few regional governments are able to beat these networks quickly and decisively on their own. Thus, the West should consider making short-term, limited intervention on the side of existing governmental bodies the norm. Mali is a model for this type of intervention, using a Western QRF to buy time for state and regional forces to assemble, a combined effort to eliminate the opposing network, and a planned transition to a UN peacekeeping force as the method to ensure a stable outcome and continued international involvement.

Counterexamples come to mind quickly, of course.  Should the international community have attempted to defeat the RPF and keep the genocidal Habyarimana regime in power in Rwanda after April 1994?  Or come to Mobutu’s aid in 1997 when the old dinosaur was finally chased out of Kinshasa by Laurent Kabila?  These are both extreme cases – Rwanda for the scale of the violence perpetrated against an ethnic minority during the war, and Congo based on the sheer degree to which the state apparatus had been undermined and personalized during Mobutu’s rule.  It’s not clear to me how many similarities these countries share with pre-2003 Iraq or pre-2011 Libya.

Of course, after the rebels won in Rwanda and the DRC, their outcomes have been almost entirely divergent, with a stable, developmental state emerging in Rwanda and a violent, patrimonial status quo holding strong in the Congo.  Setting aside concerns about political repression by the RPF for the moment, the Rwandan example is basically the best-case scenario for the international community – a strong, organized rebel group comes in and puts the country back together after conflict’s end.  To use Carpenter’s metric here, life is probably better for the average Rwandan today than it was before 1994.  The Congolese case is close to the worst scenario, where armed groups continue to violently contest control of territory for years after the official end of the war, and the central state remains weak and corrupt.  For millions of people in eastern DRC, life has definitely gotten worse since the early 1990s, and in most of the rest of the country things have probably changed fairly little since that point.

So how to evaluate Carpenter’s proposal?  For many countries, I think it’s sound.  Violent political transitions can do an incredible amount of damage, and the likelihood that a new government will be substantially more democratic or development-oriented than its predecessor seems pretty low, so trying to keep active conflict to a minimum will probably be the single most helpful thing the international community could do to protect civilians.  But there’s also an obvious need to re-evaluate in the case of of genocidal violence or extreme state weakness.