Visualizing Kinshasa’s population

I recently came across a fascinating post from The Pudding visualizing the populations of cities around the world as mountains.  (H/t to Naunihal Singh, who shares lots of other similarly interesting things as well.)  Let’s check out how Kinshasa’s 13 million people look compared to other places with similar populations.

What really stands out to me about Kin is its extreme concentration.  Population density drops off dramatically as soon as one leaves the city.  I recall being struck by this on a trip to Matadi a few years ago, where hours went by without passing any settlement larger than 10 or so houses.

Map showing the population of Kinshasa as a red mountain.  All of the surrounding area is white and largely devoid of people.

Conversely, London’s population is much more evenly distributed both within the city itself and across the surrounding area.

Map showing London's population as a mountain.  There's a large red peak in the city itself, but lots of smaller red peaks in all the surrounding towns.

Bengaluru points to yet another model for distributing the population.  The city itself is densely populated, and surrounded by a lot of fairly dense towns, but relatively few people in between the towns themselves.  This presumably reflects the larger role that agriculture plays in the Indian economy compared to the British.  London’s suburbs stretch on without being interrupted by fields quite so often.

Map of Bengaluru, showing lots of high red peaks of population with less densely inhabited white space between them

 

Let’s build African research centers in Africa

The image shows a photo of LSE and text reading "LSE is the perfect setting for a centre dedicated to Africa and the ongoing education of future generations of African leaders" - Firoz LaljiImage from Africa@LSE

Via Duncan Green, I just learned about the new Centre for Public Authority and International Development (CPAID), which is hosted at the Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa at LSE and funded with a £5 million, five-year grant from the Economic and Social Research Council.  According to LSE’s announcement, CPAID will “study how families, clans, religious leaders, aid agencies, civil society, rebel militia and vigilante groups contribute to governance, along with formal and semi-formal government institutions. The research will mainly focus on the lives of ordinary people, in particular vulnerable and marginalised groups and populations … in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Ethiopia.”

These are definitely important topics, and a good corrective to the type of political science research that focuses overmuch on formal institutions in places where the state is weak.  It’s always great to see more research on the DRC and other states affected by conflict, which tend to be understudied.  And LSE’s got a very strong team of researchers.

And.

Why is it seen as neutral and acceptable to build prominent centers of African studies outside of Africa, managed primarily by people who are not from Africa?

Why does the Africa Centre’s founder, who is himself from Uganda, feel that future African leaders are better off being trained in London than in their own countries?

Why are Northern academics so good at studying inequality and uneven post-colonial power dynamics in the South, and so bad at recognizing their own role in perpetuating inequality within the international scholarly community?

Let me be clear: I think it’s really important for every country to have scholars who are interested in international affairs.  Places like the Centre for Africa or Berkeley’s own Center for African Studies do important work making African affairs accessible to their university communities, and to the broader scholarly community.  And I myself am one of those foreign scholars who’s deeply interested in Africa.

My criticism is of the way in which the exclusion of African scholars from knowledge production about Africa is seen as normal and unremarkable.  Even in the field of African studies, where local scholars would seem to have a comparative advantage, only 15% of studies are written by authors based on the continent.  The situation is even worse in the sciences, where less than 1% of the world’s scientific research comes from Africa.  We must be missing so many interesting voices, so many valuable contributions to knowledge, because we’re systematically underinvesting in African academics.  Spending £5 million to set up a research center in the UK rather than somewhere like Accra or Nairobi (or Tamale or Eldoret or Kisangani) only perpetuates the problem.

Fortunately, there are other organizations working to remedy this inequality — and I’m in the process of starting one of them.  Stay tuned for more announcements about this project in the next few days.

Links I liked

internationalcommunity

“The International Community” (via Ken Opalo)

  • World Politics Review has a series of ten articles covering the rise of protest movements across Africa.  Another important source of information about political activism in Africa is the Afrobarometer, which currently faces cuts to its funding.  If you’ve used Afrobarometer data in your research, please fill out this survey to demonstrate its importance.

china-in-africaSource: African Visual Data

nnenna1

ahmed-vision

Links I liked

CoLagO8UAAAlzBj

From Gerry Simpson on Twitter: “Lebanon – size of UK’s Devon & Cornwall regions – shelters 1.5 million refugees while whole of UK has about 150,000”

  • Satire: The Gospel According to Nigeria. “In the beginning the British created the Northern and Southern protectorates. Now, the nation was formless and empty and darkness covered our collective identity…”  Not satire: Uganda invests US$88K in a “porn-detecting machine

cashtransfers_overview_web3-01.png

Links I liked

151216112359-human-mobility-and-the-spread-of-ebola-in-west-africa-2014-super-169

Mobility patterns during the 2014 Ebola outbreak, using mobile phone data, via CNN.

article-2311302-195F92AD000005DC-823_634x410

Going the last mile in ending extreme poverty

Brookings had an excellent blog series last month on going the last mile to end extreme poverty.  The posts were adapted from a book of the same name which was just released.  I was most struck by Raj Desai’s article on the role that welfare programs played in ending extreme poverty in today’s high income countries.  As he pointed out, when the US, UK, and Germany adopted major welfare programs in the late 1800s and early 1900s, they had the same GDP per capita (in real terms) as India, Indonesia and China do today.  Welfare subsequently played a major role in eliminating extreme poverty in these countries.  So why haven’t today’s middle income countries done the same?

His answer is worth quoting at length.

The earliest social protection programs in Western Europe were of the contributory variety—financed out of taxes on wages—as a way of preventing social conflict. Otto von Bismarck’s pension, sickness insurance, and worker compensation programs were, after all, created to pre-empt a Social Democratic victory in Germany. These systems, combined with the political changes taking place in the continent, would lead to dramatic expansions in social protection in later decades. Even as industrialization initially caused poverty, it also created rising wages for workers. Eventually, organized working classes formed a strong alliance with the fast-growing, urban middle class. This political coalition sought policies that would protect itself from economic cycles—especially after the economic turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s—that would eventually result in the postwar welfare system. Indeed, the durability of these welfare programs may be attributed to the participation of the middle class, which shaped program design: welfare programs provided universal coverage so that the middle class itself was not excluded from benefits.

Many of today’s developing countries have followed a very different path. Labor tends to be less organized and have weaker relative bargaining strength. Much of the labor force remains in the informal sector and is left out of any contributory schemes, which tend to have limited scope. Social protection is more reliant on a fragmented system consisting of a large number of non-contributory programs financed out of general revenues. More importantly, the preferences of both governments and donors are mainly for programs that target particular sub-populations to achieve cost efficiency.

Consequently, an opposite political dynamic appears to be playing out in developing countries. Instead of middle class “buy-in” resulting in broader and more comprehensive programs, targeted and fragmented programs are inhibiting median-voter support for social protection and leading to middle-class exit. The consequences are familiar to designers of targeted social protection—their vulnerability to shifts in political winds, their susceptibility to abuse or capture by elites, and their occasional failure to outlive the aid programs that may finance them. The overall result is that the demand for comprehensive welfare programs in middle-income countries remains weak.

One of the best succinct descriptions of the political economy of social protection that I’ve yet come across, and an interesting consideration thinking about novel social protection delivery mechanisms like GiveDirectly’s potential partnerships with regional governments in Kenya.