Africa Update for October 2021

The latest edition of Africa Update is out! We’ve got Africa’s 100 largest cities, debates on gun policy in Nigeria, 13 films on the queer African experience, an ambitious plan to refill Lake Chad,  and more.

West Africa: Sierra Leone has voted to abolish the death penalty. Algeria is expelling migrants from West Africa by driving them over the border with Niger and abandoning them in the desert.  New research from Ghana suggests that the West African Senior School Certificate Examinations, which determines university admissions, may vary substantially in difficulty from year to year.  Some Nigerian officials are calling for citizens to be armed in order to combat insecurity – but the experience of the US suggests that high rates of gun ownership promote violent crime and injury rather than reducing them.  In Mali, descent-based slavery remains a widespread problem. 

Sunset behind the Nairobi skyline
Sunset in Nairobi, by Sebastian Wanzalla via Samira Sawlani

Central Africa: The Congo River provides the main trade route between major cities in the DRC, but the boats that ply it are often overloaded and prone to sinking.  Learn more about Transaqua, a proposed 2400 km-long canal which would replenish Lake Chad with water from the Congo River.  “An investigative report says that Russian operatives in the Central African Republic who had been billed as unarmed advisers are actually leading the fighting.”  Don’t miss this thoughtful article on the class dynamics of Museveni’s rise to power in Uganda.

East Africa: What happened to the promise of Kenya’s smart city?  This is an insightful long read about the history of separatism and government oppression in northern Kenya.  Here’s how infighting within the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front led to the current conflict in Tigray.  “Nearly all of Ethiopia’s original trees have disappeared, but small pockets of old-growth forest still surround Ethiopia’s churches.”  Here’s a deep dive on the origins of today’s ongoing violence in Darfur.

A map showing forces from many foreign countries operating across Africa
Map of foreign forces in Africa via Facts About Africa

Southern Africa: Zimbabwe’s rigid bureaucratic policies about identity documents and discrimination against ethnic minorities mean that nearly half of births go unregistered.  Zimbabwe has also just changed the law to allow pregnant students to continue attending secondary school instead of being expelled.  In Namibia, same-gender couples who were married in South Africa but also have Namibian citizenship are fighting to have their marriages recognized by the Namibian government.  Meet Gloria Majiga-Kamoto, the pioneering Malawian environmentalist who helped get the courts to enforce a ban on single-use plastics.

Labor & livelihoods: In South Africa, a group of mining companies agreed to pay over R5 billion / US$330 million to thousands of their employees who developed TB and silicosis after working in the mines – but three years later, fewer than 10 claims have been processed.  A group of farmers in Malawi have filed suit against two major British tobacco companies, saying they were forced to work seven days per week without pay or the opportunity to educate their children.  This is a moving portrait of the limited livelihood choices available to South Sudanese refugees in Sudan.

A graph showing that Kenya's debt has grown by 4 times over from 2012 - 2022
Kenya’s debt challenge in one graph, from Citizen TV Kenya

Urbanization: Get to know Africa’s 100 largest cities.  Nairobi is rapidly losing its green space, leaving it hotter and more vulnerable to diseases spread by rats and bats.  In Johannesburg, “mining is largely over, but the people are left. They will need to make the wealth of the future through their collaboration and imagination.”

Public health: Rwanda has legalized medical marijuana.  New research from Rwanda also finds that COVID-19 lockdowns were effective in reducing rates of air pollution in Kigali.  Dr Ambroise Wonkam has an ambitious plan to map three million African genomes and investigate the genetic causes of various illnesses.  In South Africa, people without valid national IDs or refugee status are being left out of COVID-19 vaccine plans.

Three images of beautiful natural settings with plastic rubbish scattered around them, and travel stamps in the background
Check out the winning images of the Contemporary African Photography prize, like this one from Aàdesokan

Arts & culture: The Journal of African History has an interesting new podcast, and the Goethe Institut in Dakar has released a podcast on Senegalese history.  Jennifer Nansubuga Makumbi recommends her five favorite books.  Check out these 13 films about the queer experience in Africa.  This is a great piece about creating archives of digital feminism across Africa.

Academics: Lots of interesting resources coming up for African scholars abroad, including the Program on African Social Research in New York, the Africa Policy Research Institute in Berlin, and the Graduate Application International Network for prospective econ MA/PhD students.  There are also new editions of Conjonctures de l’Afrique Centrale from CREAC, the Alternative Report on Africa from RASA, and Africa Development from CODESRIA.

Africa Update for May 2020

The latest edition of Africa Update is out! We’ve got mental health in Ghana, home brewing in South Africa, vintage Somali May Day celebrations, Nigerian digital art, and more.

Photos from last year’s Lamu dhow race, by Roland Klemp

West Africa: In Ghana, activists are encouraging men to speak out about their mental health issues.  Ghana is also using drones to efficiently transport coronavirus test swabs for analysis.  Lockdowns are hitting countries like Senegal hard, where 85% of people in a recent survey said their incomes had dropped.  

Central Africa: Uganda has banned the import of used clothing over concerns about coronavirus.  Uganda has also prohibited the use of public transport during the pandemic, even though this is cutting many people off from medical care and increasing rates of domestic violence.  This is a strangely beautiful drone video of Kampala’s empty streets during lockdown.  Here’s how a financier of the Rwandan genocide was captured in France 26 years later.

Some interesting data on revenue performance across the continent, via Amaka Anku

East Africa: Somalia has launched its first ever government-run cash transfer program for over 1 million vulnerable citizens.  Somalia also has few reported coronavirus deaths, but informal reports from gravediggers suggest the real toll is higher.  Kenya has created a new state corporation meant to profit from the labor of people in prisons.  Tanzania appears to be covering up its real number of coronavirus deaths, even as the president has refused to take basic safety precautions.

Southern Africa: Malawi is one of the few countries without a coronavirus lockdown, after the high court blocked it over concerns of its economic impact on poor citizens.  South Africa banned alcohol sales during the lockdown, leading supermarkets to just coincidentally leave all the ingredients for home brewing next to each other.  South African Airways will be divided up amongst its competitors after going into bankruptcy.

Art interlude: check out this amazing vintage Somali May Day Poster, via Faduma Hassan

Coronavirus: Many African countries have limited scientific lab capacity, and had to use it for testing instead of genomic sequencing, which means that any eventual vaccine might not be as effective for viral strains on the continent.  There’s some interesting data here about the varied nature of lockdowns across Africa, including the fact that most countries imposed them unusually early, with fewer than 10 domestic cases.  Reporting on coronavirus in Africa should do more to highlight the many mutual aid groups supporting their communities.

Other health news: A new malaria vaccine being piloted in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi could make the virus less severe.  Only 18 African countries have adequate systems for recording births and deaths.  Putting chlorine dispensers next to communal water sites is an easy way to improve sanitation in Uganda. 

Agriculture: Here’s a good summary of how the pandemic is affecting food systems across Africa.  People used to respond to locust invasions in East Africa by eating them, but new research says that this strategy doesn’t work any longer as the bugs are exposed to too many pesticides. How can regional rice market integration help avoid shortages in West Africa?  Exports of medical marijuana and hemp are growing across Africa, even as many countries still ban recreational smoking.

Countries vary widely in the percentage of their citizens without access to national IDs, via Carlos Lopes

Economics + technology: Global remittance flows are expected to drop by more than US$100 billion as immigrants abroad are affected by the pandemic.  African tax collectors don’t have very many good options for making up lost revenue due to the pandemic. On the bright side, the virus is driving innovations in technology across Africa.

Gender: Check out the great resources at the African Feminism website and the African Feminist Archive.  Meet the female athletes breaking barriers in Somaliland.  Nigeria has some of the world’s strictest abortion laws, and over 60,000 women die annually from illegal abortions or complications during childbirth.  Rwanda has pardoned 50 women accused of having illegal abortions, but hasn’t changed its restrictive abortion laws.

I’m loving Adekunle Adeleke‘s creative digital portraits

Immigration: In China, African immigrants are facing discrimination over fears that they’re spreading the virus.  Israel has nullified a law which discouraged people from applying for asylum by forcing them to deposit 20% of their monthly salaries in savings accounts.  Meet the scholar studying the global fashion history of the African diaspora.  And Astrid Haas and I have written about whether safe rural migration programs could support urban safety nets in African countries during the pandemic.

Are African countries doing enough to provide economic relief during the pandemic?

800px-Mobile_money_transfer
A pre-covid cash transfer withdrawal in Kenya, via Wikipedia

I’ve got an article out at the New Humanitarian looking at how African countries have responded to the economic impacts of coronavirus.  Most countries were quick to take public health measures to contain the virus, but responding to its economic harms has taken more time.  The first wave of economic measures mostly benefitted the middle class:

Economic relief efforts have come in two waves so far. The first, implemented in late March and early April, often involved cuts in the fees and taxes citizens must pay to the government or to banks.

For example, Kenya has cut income tax rates for both the lowest and the highest earning categories, and has cut corporate tax rates from 30 percent to 25 percent. Ghana is providing free water to citizens as long as they don’t have any overdue bills with the national water company. And 18 African countries have lowered interest rates to encourage individuals and businesses to borrow from banks.

These relief efforts are fairly easy for governments to implement, since they only involve changing payment policies. They also primarily benefit the middle class, who are more likely to have formal jobs that pay income taxes, fully paid water bills, and loans from a bank.

Pro-poor relief efforts are now getting off the ground, albeit more slowly:

The second wave of economic relief efforts is now getting underway as of mid-April. This has involved direct support to poor people who might otherwise go hungry.

Rwanda and Uganda have already begun providing people in their capital cities with food aid. Kenya and Malawi have started cash transfers, and South Africa has increased its monthly payments to current welfare beneficiaries, and is creating new cash transfer programmes for the newly unemployed…

Notably, the countries that moved relatively quickly on economic relief all had welfare programmes in place already. But these existing schemes are primarily aimed at alleviating rural poverty, while the impact of coronavirus is being felt most heavily in cities. This means many countries are being forced to create new relief programmes rather than scaling up existing ones.

 

Snapshots of coronavirus response in Kenya and Senegal

Two interesting new sets of polling data have recently come out about pandemic response in Kenya (from the Population Council) and Senegal (from the Center for Global Development).  Here are some key points.

Kenya

  • Public health
    • 83% of people knew that fever was a symptom of the disease, but only 52% knew that coughing also was
    • 85% of people said they’re staying home more than they usually do, but 79% had left the house at least once in the last day (likely for work or shopping)
    • 76% of people say they’re washing their hands 7 times per day or more
  • Economics
    • 36% of people have lost all their income and 45% of people have lost some of their income in the last two weeks (81% of total sample)
    • 68% of people say they’ve had to reduce their food intake
    • Only 7% of people have received any assistance
    • Most of the assistance provided came from NGOs or the business community, and was largely soap (72%) and food (40%)
    • The people receiving assistance often did not report that they had been skipping meals, suggesting that the most vulnerable people aren’t being helped

Senegal

  • Public health
    • Almost everyone had heard of coronavirus, and 90% of people said they had stopped attending services at their mosque due to the lockdown
    • 72% of people supported a continued lockdown, although support is lower among people who’ve lost some of their income
  • Economics
    • 85% of people report having lost some or all of their income
    • Over 33% are skipping meals
    • 45% of people say that food prices have increased
    • The population of Dakar has decreased by 5% as people flee to rural areas

Interesting academic articles for April 2020

Here’s what I’ve been looking forward to reading recently!

Eric Edmonds and Caroline Theoharides. 2020.  “The short term impact of a productive asset transfer in families with child labor: Experimental evidence from the Philippines.”  Journal of Development Economics.

Productive asset grants have become an important tool in efforts to push the very poor out of poverty, but they require labor to convert the asset into income. Using a clustered randomized trial, we evaluate the impact of a key component of the Government of Philippines’ child labor elimination program, a $518 productive asset grant directed at families with child laborers. We find that households rely upon family members for the labor to work the asset. Adolescent labor is the most available labor in the household, and we observe increases in employment among adolescents not engaged in child labor at baseline. Households with a family firm or business prior to treatment especially lack available adult labor to work with the asset, leading to increases in child labor, including hazardous work, amongst children who were not in child labor at baseline.

Cesi Cruz, Julian Labonne and Pablo Querubin.  2020.  “Social Network Structures and the Politics of Public Goods Provision: Evidence from the Philippines.”  American Political Science Review.

We study the relationship between social structure and political incentives for public goods provision. We argue that when politicians—rather than communities—are responsible for the provision of public goods, social fractionalization may decrease the risk of elite capture and lead to increased public goods provision and electoral competition. We test this using large-scale data on family networks from over 20 million individuals in 15,000 villages of the Philippines. We take advantage of naming conventions to assess intermarriage links between families and use community detection algorithms to identify the relevant clans in those villages. We show that there is more public goods provision and political competition in villages with more fragmented social networks, a result that is robust to controlling for a large number of village characteristics and to alternative estimation techniques.

Soundarya Chidambaram.  2020.  “How do institutions and infrastructure affect mobilization around public toilets vs. piped water? Examining intra-slum patterns of collective action in Delhi, India.”  World Development.

Why does a slum community mobilize differently around different public services? I use qualitative data derived from ethnographic fieldwork in four urban slum communities in Delhi, India, to examine the strategies they employ for countering everyday problems of access to water and toilets. … Caste, gender, religion, class, and influential slum leaders no doubt mediate everyday social relations in Indian slums, but communities that surmount these obstacles may still not be able to mobilize in a way that improves everyday service delivery. I argue that communities are able to coordinate when they think their efforts will yield success – both locally in terms of inducing reciprocity and reducing free riding as well as when they get appropriate institutional support for their initiatives. Infrastructural characteristics unique to a service determine whether reciprocity and cooperation can be sustained within the built environment of the slum. Bureaucratic complexity determines whether communities will be able to negotiate successfully. In the case of water, easy adaptability within the neighborhood and ease of bureaucratic access allow for sustained coordination within communities. The infrastructural nature of toilets makes it harder to find arrangements that will work within the slum ecology and induce cooperation. The complicated institutional dynamics create obstacles on top of that deter sustained mobilization. What communities experience instead is a sporadic pattern of collective action around poorly functioning public toilets.

Randall Akee, William Copeland, John Holbein, and Emilia Simeonova.  2020.  “Human Capital and Voting Behavior across Generations: Evidence from an Income Intervention.”  American Political Science Review.

Despite clear evidence of a sharp income gradient in voting participation, it remains unclear whether income truly causes voting. In this article, we investigate how exogenous increases in unearned income affect voting in U.S. elections for two generations (parents and children) from the same household. In contrast to predictions made by current models of voting, we find the income shock had no effect on parentsvoting behaviors. However, we also find that increasing household income has heterogeneous effects on the civic participation of children from different socioeconomic backgrounds. It increases childrens voting propensity among those raised in initially poorer familiesresulting in substantially narrowed participatory gaps. Our results are consistent with a more nuanced view of how individual resources affect patterns of voting than the dominant theoretical framework of votingthe resource modelallows. Voting is fundamentally shaped by the human capital accrued long before citizens are eligible to vote.

Kate Baldwin, Dean Karlan, Christopher Udry, and Ernest Appiah.  2020.  “How Political Insiders Lose Out When International Aid Underperforms: Evidence from a Participatory Development Experiment in Ghana.”  Working paper.

Participatory development is designed to mitigate problems of political bias in pre-existing local government but also interacts with it in complex ways. Using a five-year randomized controlled study in 97 clusters of villages (194 villages) in Ghana, we analyze the effects of a major participatory development program on participation in, leadership of and investment by preexisting political institutions, and on households’ overall socioeconomic well-being. Applying theoretical insights on political participation and redistributive politics, we consider the possibility of both cross-institutional mobilization and displacement, and heterogeneous effects by partisanship. We find the government and its political supporters acted with high expectations for the participatory approach: treatment led to increased participation in local governance and reallocation of resources. But the results did not meet expectations, resulting in a worsening of socioeconomic wellbeing in treatment versus control villages for government supporters. This demonstrates international aid’s complex distributional consequences.

Donald P. Green, Anna M. Wilke, and Jasper Cooper.  2020.  “Countering violence against women by encouraging disclosure: A mass media experiment in rural Uganda.”  Comparative Political Studies.

Violence against women (VAW) is widespread in East Africa, with almost half of married women experiencing physical abuse. Those seeking to address this issue confront two challenges: some forms of domestic violence are widely condoned, and it is the norm for witnesses to not report incidents. Building on a growing literature showing that education-entertainment can change norms and behaviors, we present experimental evidence from a media campaign attended by over 10,000 Ugandans in 112 rural villages. In randomly assigned villages, video dramatizations discouraged VAW and encouraged reporting. Results from interviews conducted several months after the intervention show no change in attitudes condoning VAW yet a substantial increase in willingness to report to authorities, especially among women, and a decline in the share of women who experienced violence. The theoretical implication is that interventions that affect disclosure norms may reduce socially harmful behavior even if they do not reduce its acceptability.

Gemma Dipoppa.  2020.  “How Criminal Organizations Expand to Strong States: Migrants’ Exploitation and Vote Buying in Northern Italy.”  Job market paper.  

Criminal organizations are widely believed to emerge in weak states unable to protect the property rights and safety of their citizens. Yet, criminal groups often expand to states with strong capacity and well-functioning institutions. This paper proposes a theory accounting for this phenomenon. I focus on one distinctive feature of strong states: their capacity to enforce competition. I argue that criminal organizations expand by striking agreements with political and economic actors facing competition and to which they can offer critical resources to gain an edge over competitors. I test this theory in the context of Northern Italy, a region with high social capital and well-functioning democratic institutions, but which has suffered increasing levels of mafia infiltration since the 1960s. I construct a new measure of mafia presence at the municipality level, by scraping mafia-related news from historic newspapers and validating them with present time mafias indicators from judicial sources and NGOs. I test two predictions of the theory. First, using an instrumental variable approach, I show that increases in market competition (due to a construction boom) and in mafias’ capacity to offer cheap illegal labor (by exploiting migrants from mafia-controlled areas in the south) allowed criminal groups to expand to the north. Second, I show that parties that entered in agreements with criminal groups gained a persistent electoral advantage in mafia-infiltrated cities and only after infiltration. This evidence suggests that mafias’ expansion leveraged deals with economic and political actors in strong states, pointing to the need to re-conceptualize criminal organizations not only as substitutes for weak states, but also as complements to states with strong institutions.

Rob Blair and Nicholas Sambanis.  2020.  “Forecasting Civil Wars: Theory and Structure in an Age of “Big Data” and Machine Learning.”  Journal of Conflict Resolution.

Does theory contribute to forecasting accuracy? We use event data to show that a parsimonious model grounded in prominent theories of conflict escalation can forecast civil war onset with high accuracy and over shorter temporal windows than has generally been possible. Our forecasting model draws on “procedural” variables, building on insights from the contentious politics literature. We show that a procedural model outperforms more inductive, atheoretical alternatives and also outperforms models based on countries’ structural characteristics, which previously dominated models of civil war onset. We find that process can substitute for structure over short forecasting windows. We also find a more direct connection between theory and forecasting than is sometimes assumed, though we suggest that future researchers treat the value-added of theory for prediction not as an assumption but rather as a hypothesis to test.

Adam Lichtenheld.  2020.  “Explaining Population Displacement Strategies in Civil Wars: A Cross-National Analysis.”  International Organization.

Why do combatants uproot civilians in wartime? In this paper I identify cross-national variation in three population-displacement strategies—cleansing, depopulation, and forced relocation—and test different explanations for their use by state actors. I advance a new “assortative” theory to explain forced relocation, the most common type. I argue that combatants displace not only to expel undesirable populations, but also to identify the undesirables in the first place by forcing people to send signals of loyalty and affiliation based on whether, and to where, they flee. This makes communities more “legible” and facilitates the extraction of rents and recruits. I test these arguments using a novel Strategic Displacement in Civil Conflict data set (1945–2008). Consistent with my expectations, different displacement strategies occur in different contexts and appear to follow different logics. Cleansing is more likely in conventional wars, where territorial conquest takes primacy, while forced relocation is more likely in irregular wars, where identification problems are most acute. The evidence indicates that cleansing follows a logic of punishment. The results for relocation, however, are consistent with the implications of my assortative logic: it is more likely to be employed by resource-constrained incumbents fighting insurgencies in “illegible” areas—rural, peripheral territories. A case study from Uganda based on in-depth fieldwork provides evidence for the assortative mechanism. As the most comprehensive analysis of wartime displacement strategies to date, this paper challenges some core assumptions about a devastating form of contemporary political violence.

University of Zurich lecture on coronavirus relief

Slide deck titled "using markets and money to respond to coronavirus in African countries," with a photo of a woman at Ghana's Makola market on it

Dina Pomeranz kindly invited me to give a guest lecture to her “Global Poverty Analysis” undergraduate course at the University of Zurich earlier this month.  I summarized the points I made in my African Arguments piece about the need for “smart lockdowns” in African countries, which involve safely re-opening markets and providing income support to vulnerable people.  The slides are here, and you can watch a video of the lecture here.  (Photo on the title slide is via Wikipedia.)